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Abstract
In several countries governments fund childcare provision, but in many others it is privately funded as
labour regulation mandates that rms have to provide childcare services. For this latter case, there is no
empirical evidence on the e¤ects generated by the nancial burden of childcare provision. In particular,
there is no evidence about who e¤ectively pays (i.e. rms or employees) and how it pays (i.e. via wages
and/or employment). This study is the rst one to provide such evidence. Our hypothesis is that, in
imperfect labour markets (e.g. oligopsonistic), rms will transfer childcare cost on to their workers. To
analyze this, we exploit a discontinuity on childcare provision mandated by Chilean labour regulation.
Our results suggest that rms transfer entirely the cost of childcare (nearly 100%) to their workers via
lower wages (not only to female but also to male workers) and not through the alteration of the share
of male workers within the rm. This is consistent with our nding that rms do not manipulate the
threshold (number of female workers) because they avoid the burden by transfering the cost to their
employees.
JEL Classication : H32, J08, J13, J18, J33, J42.
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1 Introduction
Childcare policies started to be in the public debate, at least, since the 19th century as the Industrial
Revolution in part was fueled by the economic necessity of many women, single and married, to nd waged
work outside their home.1 Child care policies were mainly discussed in order to strengthen the parent-
child link without negatively a¤ecting their labour market situation, in particular female labour market
participation. This latter point is still a concern in many countries around the world. One of the examples is
the Chilean case, as female participation is low (47%, INE (2010)) relative to other OECD countries (57%,
OECD (2010)).2
Previous empirical literature on childcare policies can be classied into two main strands. On the one
hand there are studies that analyze the e¤ects of childcare policies on the development of cognitive abilities
of children (see Baker, Gruber and Milligan (2005), Berlinski, Galiani and Gertler (2009), Berlinski, Galiani
and Manacorda (2008), Bernal (2008), Carneiro, Loken and Salvanes (2008), Herbst and Tekin (2010) and
Urzúa and Veramendi (2011)). On the other hand, there are studies that analyze the e¤ects of childcare
policies on femaleslabour market participation and employment (see Baker, Gruber and Milligan (2005),
Berlinsky and Galiani (2007), Betancor (2011), Blau and Tekin (2003), Cascio (2006), Encina and Martínez
(2009), Gelbach (2002), Guzmán (2009), Jaumotte (2003), Schlosser (2011) and UNDP (2008)).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence on who bears (i.e. pays) the nancial burden
of childcare regulation when it is not publicly funded. This is important as, if it is indeed paid by rms
then this legislation is a tax to female workers in the sense that is a disincentive to hire female workers (i.e.
an incentive to avoid such regulation by manipulating the number of women hired). However, if rms are
not paying someone else must do it (for example: workers). Thus, the objective of this study is to present,
for the rst time, evidence about who bears the nancial burden (i.e. rms or employees) of childcare. In
order to do this, we exploit Chilean childcare regulation where the labour code establishes that the nancial
responsibility about childcare bears on rms. In particular, in its Article No203 states that every rm
with 20 or more female workers, regardless of their age and marital status, has to provide childcare facilities
within rm premises so that mothers can feed their children and leave them there while working. It also
states that it will be understood that rms fulll this obligation if they pay the cost of a private childcare
1See for example "The History of Child Care in the U.S." where it is pointed out that "To draw attention to the need for child
care and to demonstrate approved methods of rearing children from infancy on,a group of prominent New York philanthropists
at the 1893 Worlds Columbian Exhibition in Chicago went on to found the National Federation of Day Nurseries (NFDN),
the rst nationwide organization devoted to this issue, in in the US ". (http://www.socialwelfarehistory.com/programs/child-
care-the-american-history/).
2Actually, Chile has one of the lowest rate of female participation (only above Mexico, Turkey and Italy) among OECD
countries (OECD (2010)).
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facility. This Article also establishes that the employer will also have to pay for the transport costs of the
female worker, in case the childcare facility is located outside of the rm. Additionally, Article No206 states
that female workers are granted with up to 1 hour within the day to feed their children (if the childcare
facility is located outside of the rm there is a time extension regarding the time spent traveling from the
rm to the facility), which is considered as a worked hour. Currently these regulations involve children
between 6-24 months old only.
Therefore, Chilean regulation imposes, theoretically, an additional cost to rms as after a certain number
of female workers, rms have to bear di¤erent costs such as childcare provision, potential productivity losses
for the rm due to the time spent by the female worker feeding her child and in occasions the transport costs
to the childcare facility. In order to explore if rms are indeed bearing these costs, we exploit the discontinuity
given by Chilean regulation to compare wages of workers just above and just below the threshold given the
regulation using a regression discontinuity (RD) design (Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw (2001), Imbens and
Lemieux (2008), Lee (2008), Lee and Lemieux (2010)). If for the former, wages are lower it could imply that
rms are transferring the costs to their workers (lower option in Figure 1). If rms do not transfer all the
cost, and males and females are substitutes, there should be an employment composition e¤ect as it would
be more convenient to relatively hire more males. Thus, we should observe some degree of manipulation of
the female/male employee ratio and/or other simptoms that randomness at the threshold is not very credible
(upper option in Figure 1). Because this issue is crucial we analize it extensively below.
For our study we use administrative data from the Unemployment Insurance system provided by the
Chilean Ministry of Labour. We show that, even if the rm is the one who theoretically (legally) bears
the nancial cost of childcare, at the end who pays the childcare bill (nearly 100% of it) are workers
through lower wages. Also, we do not nd any evidence of manipulation of the forcing variable in any of
the ways we used to check the internal validity of RD. Therefore, both sides of the story points to the same
conclusion: rms do not manipulate the threshold (number of female workers), because they avoid the
burden by transfering the cost to their employees.
To provide this empirical evidence is important as there are several countries who have systems where
the employer is the responsible for childcare provision. Among them are: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela. Furthermore, to learn
from this experience is also important as there are a series of countries where there are mixed systems (such
as Denmark, France and Panama) or where legally there is no private childcare responsibility (as Cuba, El
Salvador and the United States), thus, in case they want to modify their childcare policies, they may learn
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what are the e¤ects of changing their system to a privately funded childcare policy such as the Chilean case.
This study is organized as follows: section 2 describes the institutional background, its evolution and the
economic incentives generated by it. In section 3 we present our empirical strategy while in section 4 we
present the data and the summary statistics. Finally, section 5 displays our results and presents robustness
checks for our estimates and section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
The Article No203 of the Chilean Labour Code has a long history. In 1917 it was established for the rst
time a Law (No 3,185) focused on childcare. This law established the employers obligation of childcare
provision within the rm, if the rm had more than 50 female workers.
In 1931, a modication on the 1917 Law was introduced. This modied the threshold of female workers
who activate the obligation from 50 to 20. Later, in 1981, a new modication was introduced in order to
allow rms to provide childcare by paying an external private childcare provider (authorized by JUNJI).3
Since then, the Article No203 establishes that:
 Every rm with 20 or more female workers, regardless of their age and marital status, has to provide
childcare facilities within the rm premises so that mothers can feed their children and leave them
there while working.
 It will be understood that rms fulll this obligation if they pay the cost of a private childcare facility.
This Article also states that in case the childcare facility provided by the employer is outside of the rm,
the employer will have to pay the transport costs that the female worker incurs. Additionally, Article No206
establishes that female workers are granted with up to 1 hour within the day to feed their children (if the
childcare facility is located outside of the rm there is a time extension regarding the time spent traveling
from the rm to the facility), which is considered as a worked hour. Hence, all of the rms that are a¤ected
by Article No203 must also fulll the obligations established by Article No206.
3Where JUNJI refers to Junta Nacional de Jardines Infantiles (National Organization of Public Childcare Centres). JUNJI
is a state institution in charge of providing early childhood education to economically disadvantaged children.
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Currently, the Article No203 of the Labour Code a¤ects a few rms. However, it a¤ects a great proportion
of female dependent workers. Given the data supplied by the Chilean Ministry of Labour, in October 2010,
only 3% of rms in Chile (around 9,300) have 20 or more female workers. Nevertheless, these few rms
concentrate more than 71% of the dependent female workers, which make the childcare costs faced by these
rms quite high. Some descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.
Finally, it is important to mention that if rms do not fulll their obligation the penalty reaches 70 UTM
per employee.4 Given this, the number of rms that do not fulll their obligations is very low. For example
in 2011, only 118 rms were detected in this fault, according to information provided by the Chilean Ministry
of Labour.
3 Empirical Strategy
The way Article No203 operates allows us to use the discontinuity generated when a rm moves from 19 to
20 female workers. This is because from that point, it is mandatory for rms to provide childcare services
(inside or outside the rm premises). The existence of this rule makes it possible to identify the impact of
this regulation on the desired outcomes.
We will refer from now on as treatment when the Article No203 is activated (i.e. rm has 20 or more
female workers). In this way, let us call yi1 the variable of interest (e.g. wages) for individual i if she receives
the treatment (i.e. works in a treated rm) and yi0 otherwise. Thus, an individual will be treated if she
works in a rm with 20 or more female workers.
Let us call di the treatment variable for worker i, dened as follows:
di =
8>><>>:
1 if Ni  20
0 if Ni < 20
where Ni is the number of female workers in the rm of worker i. Thus, we can estimate our model as
follows:
yi = f(Ni) + '  di + z0i + ui (1)
4Where UTM stands for Unidad Tributaria Mensual and it is a monthly ination-indexed measure. Currently, 1 UTM is
nearly US $82.
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where u is an error term such that E(ujd; z) = 0 and f(Ni) is a smooth function of the number of female
workers in the rm (to allow for non linearities between the outcome and the forcing variable). Additionally,
we include variables that may a¤ect the dependent variable, denoted by vector zi.
3.1 Parametric versus Non-Parametric
When there is a model such as the one presented above, previous literature use two approaches for the
estimation: parametric and nonparametric (see Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw (2001), Imbens and Lemieux
(2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010) for a detailed discussion). One of the advantages of the parametric
approach is that it is more e¢ cient when the functional form is correct. However, if the functional form is
incorrect our results will be biased.5 A disadvantage of the parametric approach is that it provides estimates
of the regression function over all values ofNi, while the RD design focuses on local estimates of the regression
function at the cuto¤ point (Lee and Lemieux (2010)).
In the non-parametric case, kernel regressions or local linear regressions can be used. Both are local
methods as they used data around the cuto¤ point to estimate the e¤ect of the policy change on the desired
outcome. However, kernel regression presents a boundary problem when applied in a RD design. This is
because we are estimating a point e¤ect at a boundary which implies that kernel regression will be a weighted
average of one-sided data points which will generate a systematic bias in the estimates (see Hahn, Todd and
van der Klaauw (2001) for a formal derivation of the bias). A solution to this problem has been suggested by
Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw (2001) who proposed to use local linear regression to reduce the importance
of the bias.6
As Lee and Lemieux (2010) pointed out, it is advisable to use both approaches (parametric and non-
parametric) when estimating the smooth function as neither of these two alone presents the supreme solution
regarding functional form problems. Therefore, the econometrician should see them more as complements
than substitutes.
The discrete nature of our assignment variable (number of female workers) has implications on the
specication choice. Lee and Card (2008) states that in this case the conditions of the non-parametric
estimation methods are not met which implies that the model is not non-parametrically identied. The
reason for this is that even with an innite amount of data, there would be no data in a region in an
"arbitrarily" small neighborhood around the cuto¤ point. Consequently, Lee and Card (2008) suggest that
5For example, if the data suggest a nonlinear model when we estimate a linear one, results might suggest a discontinuity
when in reality is just a nonlinear movement of the data.
6Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw (2001) show that the remaining bias is of an order of magnitude lower, and is comparable
to the usual bias in kernel regression at interior points.
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"one must use regressions to estimate the conditional expectation of the outcome variable at the cuto¤ point
by extrapolation". Thus, the parametric approach should be used for estimation.
In a more recent article, Lee and Lemieux (2010) points out that the discreteness of the assignment
variable does not introduce important econometric complications, for the parametric estimation, provided
that this variable is not too coarsely distributed (as in our case).7 As suggested by Lee and Card (2008), if
the polynomial function is correct, then least squares inference is appropriate.
Given this, we use the parametric approach as our baseline case. However, and as the distinction between
when a running variable is discrete and when it is continuous for practical terms is somehow always arbitrary
(as strictly speaking the running variable is always discrete), we also estimate the model using the non-
parametric approach for comparision purposes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Parametric Model
Our parametric specication is presented in the following equation:
yi =  +
pX
j=1
j(Ni   20)j + '  di + z0i + ui
And the estimated parameters are given by:
(^; '^; ^; ^) = argmin(;';;)
nX
i=1
0@yi      pX
j=1
j(Ni   20)j   'di   z0i
1A2
where p is the maximum degree of the polynomial introduced in the specication, f(Ni) is
Pp
j=1 j(Ni 
20)j , where j is a parameter that quanties the e¤ect on the outcome of the jth power of the deviation
(Ni   20). In this case the treatment is captured by the parameter '^.8
7Additionally, Lee and Lemieux (2010) point out that the discreteness of the assignment variable simplies the problem of
bandwidth choice when graphing the data as "one can simply compute and graph the mean of the outcome variable for each
value of the discrete assignment variable".
8Where '^ is the degree of passthrough of the childcare cost from the rm to its workers.
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3.2.2 Non-parametric Model
On the other hand, our nonparametric specication is estimated using local linear regressions (see Fan (1992),
Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw (2001) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008)) in both sides of the discontinuity
point. Thus, the estimated parameters of this specication are:
(^
+
; b+; ^+) = argmin(+;'+;+) nX
i=1
(yi   +   +(Ni   20)  z0+i +)2K

Ni   20
h

I(Ni  20) (2)
(^
 
; b ; ^ ) = argmin( ;' ; ) nX
i=1
(yi        (Ni   20)  z0 i  )2K

Ni   20
h

I(Ni < 20) (3)
where  is a parameter that quanties the e¤ect on the outcome of the deviation (Ni 20), K is a kernel
function and h is the bandwidth. The variable I() is an index function which takes the value 1 when the
condition in the brackets takes place and 0 otherwise. The treatment e¤ect is the di¤erence of the linear
predictions at the discontinuity point of the right and left local linear regressions. Hence, the treatment
e¤ect for the nonparametric specication will be given by the parameter '^ = ^
+   ^ .
The kernel function used is the triangular kernel.9 This is because, as Cheng, Fan and Marron (1997)
demonstrates, the triangular kernel has Asymptotic Mean Square Error minimizing properties for boundary
estimation problems.10 For the selection of the bandwidth, there are two traditional methods: (1) ad hoc
methods and (2) data driven methods such as cross validation methods (Ludwig and Miller (2007)).11 We
use the data driven approach, in particular Ludwig and Millers method (LM) for our baseline estimation as
it is more appropriate than other methods when the data is discrete. However, we also estimate the model
with the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) approach. Both methods give similar but large bandwidth,12 for
this reason we also reestimate the model with smaller bandwidths in the sensitivity analysis section. As it
will be clear, results are very similar in all the specications. For a matter of organization, we present the
baseline results with the LM method leaving all the other results in the sensitivity analysis section.
9Where the triangular kernel is: K(u) = (1  juj)1fjuj1g .
10Other kernels could also be used, however the choice of kernel typically has little impact in practice (Lee and Lemieux
(2010)).
11More details in the appendix.
12As expected given the discrete nature of the data.
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4 Data and Summary Statistics
We use cross section data from the Chilean Unemployment Insurance system for October 2010, provided
by the Ministry of Labour. This database considers information about individuals who are a¢ liated to this
system, since its origins in October 2002, or found a dependent job in the private sector after that date.13
Table 1 presents the distribution of female and male workers and rms by number of female workers
within the rm (less than 20 and 20 or more of them). As outlined above, we see that female workers tend
to concentrate in rms with 20 or more of them (almost 72% are working in rms with this characteristic)
while the distribution of male workers is relatively homogeneous among these categories. When analyzing the
number of rms in both groups we see that nearly 97% of the rms have less than 20 female workers. However,
this distribution of rms tends to be something inherent to the Chilean economy, where approximately 90%
of the rms have less than 20 workers (males and females) according to information provided by the Chilean
Ministry of Labour.
Since our main focus is related to the nancial side of childcare regulation, we separate the sample into
three sub-samples: fertile female workers, non fertile female workers and male workers. Regarding the rst
group, we examine the economic sectors where women with this characteristics are more concentrated. Table
2 presents the distribution of fertile female workers across di¤erent type of industries.14 As it can be seen 3
types of industries: Commerce, Financial Services and Social Services, concentrate nearly 80% of the fertile
female workers. The same pattern is observed for non fertile female workers as according to our data, 81%
of them are also concentrated in these industries (19% in Commerce, 17% in Financial Services and 45% in
Social Services). Hence we focus on these industries.15
In this section we present the summary statistics of the dataset used. Also, in order to give support to
the validity of our estimation procedure, we present a graphic analysis of the used variables (as suggested
by Imbens and Lemieux (2010)). Table 3 presents the summary statistics for fertile female workers (aged
between 18 and 49 years old), separated by size of the rm used in our dataset.16 We see that on average
fertile female workers are similar in observables to their peers who work in rms with less than 20 women.
13This insurance system started in october 2002 and currently more than 94% of dependent workers are a¢ liated to the
system. The Unemployment Insurance excludes independent and public sector workers.
14Women who work and are aged between 18 and 49 years are considered as fertile female workers. This denition follows
the one provided by the National Institute of Statistics (INE).
15Given the high dispersion observed in the data, we deleted those individuals at the highest and lowest 5% of the wages
within the sample.
16This separation was only based on the number of female workers, thus it was not imposed any constraint on the number of
male workers.
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Tables 4 and 5 present the summary statistics for non fertile female workers (aged between 50 and 60 years
old) and male workers, separated by size of the rm respectively. For the case of non fertile female workers
we observe that the trend is similar to the case of fertile female workers, which also coincides with the case
of men. This will be important below as balanced covariates are an indirect check that the assumption of
randomness at the threshold implicit in a RD analysis is more credible.
4.1 Graphical Analysis
When regression discontinuity design is used as a method of estimation, previous literature (Imbens and
Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010)) suggest a series of tests on the variables used. The idea is that
these checks allow us to see how robust is the internal validity of our design, in the sense of how credible our
results could be. These checks consist in:
(a) If there exists a discontinuity on the dependent variables (in our case, wages).
(b) If there exist discontinuities on control variables (in our case, age and type of industry).
(c) If there is a discontinuity on the density of the running variable (in our case, the number of female
workers in the rm).
The rst test, in (a), should suggest a discontinuity on the variable of interest, otherwise our estimation
may conclude that there are no signicant e¤ects. If there is no e¤ect here, it is unlikely that we will
nd e¤ects with the econometric specication. The tests in (b) are important as they check if covariates
present discontinuities or not. If they do, it gets unclear the causality claimed from the policy change as
the discontinuity found on the dependent variable is due to a discontinuity on the covariates and not to the
policy change. Furthermore, the smoothness of the covariates make the continuity assumption of the expected
potential outcomes more plausible (as discussed below). Finally, test (c) allow us to check if agents (in our
case rms and workers) do or do not manipulate the running variable. This is important because if there were
manipulation (i.e. a discontinuity in the density at the threshold), it would imply that agents just above the
threshold are not necessarily similar to those just below the threshold and this, as Lee and Lemieux (2010)
pointed out, would generate that the existence of a treatment being a discontinuous function of an assignment
variable would not be su¢ cient to justify the validity of an RD design. Furthermore, discontinuous rules may
generate incentives, causing behavior that would invalidate the RD approach. We check for discontinuities
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through graphical inspection and formally test for the existence of a discontinuity of the assignment variable
by using the test proposed in McCrary (2008).17
This latter issue is crucial in the RD context because as long as there imprecise manipulation of the
forcing variable, local randomization will hold, which is what we need in order to correctly estimate the
counterfactual (as it ensures the continuity assumption about the expected potential outcomes). Despite its
importance, imprecision of control of the forcing variable will often be nothing more than a conjecture, but
thankfully it has testable predictions such as indicated above by tests (b) and (c). Therefore, these two tests
are crucial for the internal validity of our empirical strategy as they allow us to test that the predictions of
local randomization holds.
4.1.1 Test A
A.1. Firms with fertile and non fertile females and males:
In Figure 2 we observe that there is a discontinuity on wages of female workers in rms with 19 relative
to rms with 20 female workers.18 Discontinuities on wages are also observed in non fertile female women
and in men, as Figure 3 and Figure 4 show. These results suggest that rms transfer the cost of childcare
not only to fertile female workers in the form of lower wages, but also to non fertile females and men as well.
We will explore the magnitude of this transfer below.
A.2. Firms with male workers only:
To further support our previous results, we apply again test (a) but now only to rms with male workers.
As the Article No203 of the labour code only applies to rms that have female workers, we should expect
no discontinuity on those rms with only male workers. Results are presented in Figure 5, and we observe
exactly what we were expecting, this is that there are no e¤ects on wages when we move from rms with
only 19 male workers to rms with only 20 male workers.
A.3. Firms with non fertile females only:
In order to study further our hypothesis, we analyze the behaviour of rms with only non-fertile female
workers (aged 50-60). If our hypothesis is true, the rm should not expect any childcare expenditure and
so there should be no discontinuity on wages. Our results are presented in Figure 6 and suggest that, as
expected there is no signicant discontinuity at the threshold.
17For more information on McCrarys (2008) test see the Appendix.
18For smoothing the data points we consider local-mean smoothing.
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4.1.2 Test B
Our next step is to apply test (b) on the covariates. They are: age and type of industry dummies. Figure 7
presents the result for fertile female workers, and we found that there are no signicant di¤erences between
both sides of the threshold. In particular we found point estimates of -0.12, 0.019, 0.02 and -0.04 for Age,
Commerce dummy, Financial Services Dummy and Social Services Dummy respectively, but none of them
were signicantly di¤erent from zero. Next, in Figures 8 and 9, we present the same graphical analysis
but now for non fertile female workers and for male workers respectively. Results again suggest no signicant
discontinuities at the threshold. Non signicant point estimates for non fertile female workers were -0.06,
-0.02, 0.004 and 0.02 for Age, Commerce dummy, Financial Services Dummy and Social Services Dummy
respectively and for males were 0.02, 0.01, -0.02 and 0.002 respectively. All these are in line with what was
suggested by the summary statistics presented above (Tables 3, 4 and 5) where covariates are balanced
between both sides of the threshold making the assumption of local randomness more credible.
4.1.3 Test C
Finally, in Figure 10 we present the result for test (c). We observe that there are no signicant discontinuities
on the density of the running variable at the threshold. This suggests no evidence of manipulation from
the agents point of view. This is crucial as Lee (2008) formally showed that one need not assume the RD
design isolates treatment variation that is as good as randomized; instead, such randomized variation is a
consequence of agentsinability to precisely control the assignment variable near the known cuto¤.
To further investigate the presence of manipulation of the assignment variable we follow McCrary (2008)
who developed a density test.19 Unfortunately, his test was developed for continuous assignment variables.
However, as Lemieux and Milligan (2008) pointed out, the discrete nature of the assignment variable does
not complicate further the analysis as it is straightforward to implement this test by estimating separately
two local linear regressions (where we considered as dependent variables the fraction and log fraction of
women below and above the threshold) and checking if there is statistical di¤erence between the predicted
outcomes at the discontinuity point.20 Our results suggest that there is no evidence of manipulation of the
assignment variable, supporting in this way our previous graphical analysis. In particular, the p-value for the
19For more details on McCrarys test see the appendix.
20We use triangular kernel as suggested by McCrary (2008). Following Lemieux and Milligan (2008), we use a window of 10
female workers (i.e. from 15 to 25 female workers per rm). The weight of the observations linearly decreases from 1 in the
threshold to 0 at 15 or 25 female workers.
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fraction of women is 0.93 and 0.90 for the log fraction of women. Hence we do not reject the null hypoythesis
of continuity.
As mentioned in section 3, the discrete nature of our data can introduce complications in the regres-
sion discontinuity analysis (Lee and Card (2008)). However, Lee and Lemieux (2010) points out that the
discreteness of the running variable (number of female workers in the rm) does not introduce important
complications if this variables is not too coarsely distributed. As Figure 10 and the McCrary test show this
seems to be the case.
Overall, tests (a), (b) and (c) support the internal validity of our identication strategy.21 However a
natural concern may appear. All the checks suggest no manipulation, but in theory rms may do it. As we
will show in the results section below, rms do not manipulate the threshold because they are transfering
the whole cost of childcare to their employees, hence they do not have incentives to manipulate.
5 Results
In this section we present the results of our estimation on wages of fertile and non fertile females and males
of the rm. Additionally, we present a sensitivity analysis of our parametric and nonparametric estimates,
in order to check their robustness. In particular, we consider di¤erent kernel functions and bandwidths and
falsication tests.
5.1 Wages
Table 6 presents the results regarding the impact of the Article No203 on fertile female workerswages. In
the Table it is possible to observe that wages on average decrease due to the treatment. The magnitude
depends on the specication used (parametric or nonparametric). For the parametric case we see that the
e¤ect varies depending on the degree of the polynomial considered. For the case of the linear polynomial the
e¤ect is an average reduction of nearly -3.9% on monthly wages while in the case of a quadratic and cubic
polynomial the e¤ect is lower, -3.4% and -3.8%, respectively. When considering a quartic polynomial the
reduction is slightly larger than the linear case, -4.2%. We also see that all these estimates are statistically
signicant at 1%. For the nonparametric case we see that the estimation yields -4.0% (LM), which is also
21Additionaly, in line with Lee and Lemieux (2010), we carried out nonparametric discontinuous regressions on the covariates.
We do not found any signicant discontinuity on the covariates, which support our previous results.
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statistically signicant at 1%. It is important to mention that even after considering di¤erent polynomial
degrees and di¤erent approaches (parametric and nonparametric) the results appear to be quite robust.
Tables 7 and 8 present the estimates, through parametric and nonparametric specications, for non
fertile female workers and male workers who are in rms along with fertile females, respectively. For the
case of non fertile female workers we see negative e¤ects ranging from -3.9% to -2.3% for the parametric
specication, and -3.8% for the nonparametric one (LM), of the Article No203 on wages but these e¤ects
seem to be less robust than the case of fertile female workers since most of the estimates are only statistically
signicant at 10%. This may be due to the considerably smaller sample size of non fertile females. In
the case of male workers we also observe negative impacts of this Article on wages, where the e¤ect varies
between -3.9% to -2.6% in the parametric case and 4.0% (LM) in the nonparametric one. These results are
statistically signicant at 1%.
If we consider an average rm with 20 female workers we see that the reduction of wages due to Article
No203 (along with Article No206) is nearly equivalent to the expected childcare cost. Hence, rms transfer
nearly 100% of the total childcare cost on to their workers. For more details about this calculation see the
Appendix.
5.1.1 Explaining the Results
At the begining our hypothesis was that rms transfered the cost of childcare to fertile female workers
due to asymetric information. Punishing those fertile female workers without children. This follows the
same reasoning than the one on health insurance, where insurance companies have asymetric information on
individuals (high and low risk individuals) and thus charge a unique premium, where high risk get a lower
premium and low risk a higher premium than under perfect information. In our case rms do the same.
That hypothesis is corroborated by our results. However we also nd that rms are transfering the cost
to non-fertile female workers and male workers as well. A potential way to explain these further results is
the following. In a competitive labour market, female and male workers who do not have children would be
penalized in the above setting, therefore they would move to rms una¤ected by the policy (i.e. those with
less than 20 female workers) until wages equalize the gains. However in imperfect labour markets with given
search costs, rms have the incentives to socialize the cost among all its workers and not only to transfer
them to fertile female workers. This is beacuse if the rm charges all the cost to a particular group, they will
have higher incentives to search for another job. Instead if they spread the cost among all their workers, the
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decrease in the wage of each worker will be lower and thus the incentive to look for another job will be lower
as well (all this given search costs). This market imperfection may be one explanation for workers stickiness
(immobility). This can be an interesting agenda for future research.
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
As Imbens and Lemieux (2008) points out, estimates that are sensitive to the order of the polynomial (in
the parametric case) and the kernel or bandwidth specication (in the non-parametric case) are not very
credible. In this section we perform several estimations using di¤erent kernel functions, bandwidths and
di¤erent slopes of the regression functions on both sides of the discontinuity of our parametric specications,
in order to check the robustness of our parametric and non parametric estimates specication (the sensitivity
to di¤erent order of the polynomial was shown above). Additionally, we perform falsication tests in order
to validate our regression discontinuity design.22
5.2.1 Alternative Kernels
The estimates of our nonparametric specications presented in up to Table 8 consider the triangular kernel.
This kernel function has special properties, as shown in Cheng, Fan and Marron (1997). In particular, this
kernel has Asymptotic Mean Square Error minimizing properties for boundary estimation problems. In
this section we use other kernel functions, such as the Epanechnikov and Biweight kernels, in order to test
the robustness of our nonparametric specication.23 The results of our estimations using these two kernel
functions for wages of fertile, non fertile female workers and men workers in Tables 9, 10 and 11 suggest
that using a di¤erent kernel function specication does not a¤ect the estimates in an important magnitude,
where di¤erences between the estimates using the triangular kernel barely di¤er from these ones.
We can conclude that the kernel specication chosen does not have an important e¤ect on the estimates
of our model. This result is aligned with what the related literature (Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee
and Lemieux (2010), for instance) says about conditions of consistent regression discontinuity estimations.
22We performed a sensitivity analysis for the size of the window considered (rms with more than 3 and less than 37 female
workers, rms with more than 7 and less than 33 female workers, for example). Our estimates do not vary in a signicant way.
The results can be obtained upon request from the authors.
23The Epanechnikov kernel is K(u) = 3
4
(1  u2)1fjuj1g and the Biweight kernel is K(u) = 1516 (1  u2)21fjuj1g.
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5.2.2 Alternative Bandwidths
We present estimates using di¤erent kernel bandwidths. In particular, we consider a di¤erence of +2, +1,
-1 and -2 of the optimal bandwidth calculated according to and Ludwig and Miller (2007). The results of
our estimations are presented in Table 12.24 We appreciate that for all outcomes, even after modifying
the bandwidths, the estimates appear to be consistent. We do not appreciate important di¤erences in our
estimations which suggests that our regression discontinuity design is well specied.
Although our bandwidth selection criteria follows Ludwig and Miller (2007), we obtain relatively large
optimal bandwidths for the case of the e¤ect of Article 203 on wages. Given this, we also consider lower
bandwidths in order to test if the robustness of our estimates.25 Tables 13, 14 and 15 present the RD
estimates considering smaller bandwidths (6 to 13). We observe that no signicant di¤erences with our
original estimates arise which supports the robustness of our specication.
5.2.3 Di¤erent Slopes on Both Sides of the Discontinuity
The baseline model dened above assumed that the slopes of the regression functions (of our parametric
specications) on each side of the discontinuity were the same, which can be a strong assumption in the case
of Regression Discontinuity Designs. We present a sensitivity analysis for our estimations considering that
these slopes may be di¤erent. The parametric model can be redened as follows:
yi =  +
pX
j=1
j(Ni   20)j + '  di +
pX
j=1
&j(Ni   20)j  di + z0i + ui
Where the main di¤erence with the specication dened in section 3.2 are the interaction terms &j(Ni  
20)j  di, which allows for di¤erent slopes on both sides of the discontinuity. Some of the results are shown
in Table 16. We see, for example that results for fertile females, suggest that considering di¤erent slopes
do not introduces major alterations of our estimates in comparison with the original ones. Similar results
hold for other groups.
5.2.4 Falsication Tests
In this section we present falsication tests. In particular, we estimate our baseline model (20 female workers)
considering di¤erent thresholds (17, 23 and 30 female workers). If the regression discontinuity design is well
24We consider the triangular kernel for this estimations.
25We also consider the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) optimal bandwidth selection method. Although smaller than Ludwig
and Miller (2007), We also obtain large optimal bandwidths with this technique (around 9 instead of 14). These big bandwidths
make sense in our context as the running variable is discrete.
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specied then we would expect a lack of statistical signicance by the RD estimators. Before estimating, in
order to make a valid RD analysis, we perform McCrarys (2008) for the density of the assignment variable
for the new threshold. Results indicate that a discontinuity on this variables is not appreciated.
Tables 17, 18 and 19 present the results of our falsication tests for fertile femaleswages, non fertile
femaleswages and maleswages, respectively. We see that the estimates are not statistically signicant
for females (fertile and non fertile) and males workers. These results show that our regression discontinuity
design performs well as changing the threshold does not yield statistically signicant estimates.
6 Conclusion
Previous literature on childcare has focused on two main strands: (i) those who analyze the e¤ect of childcare
policies on cognitive development of the child and (ii) those who study the e¤ects of these type of policies
on maternal labor supply. There are no empirical evidence on who bears the nancial burden of childcare
provision when childcare regulation mandates that rms have to provide that service. Thus, we present
the rst empirical study that analyzes who bears the nancial burden of childcare provision. We exploit
the discontinuity generated in the Chilean Labour Code by its Article 203, which mandates that rms with
20 or more female workers have to provide childcare. We explore its e¤ects on wages using a regression
discontinuity design.
Article 203 theoretically imposes an additional cost on rms which may result in di¤erent outcomes
depending on who actually bears the cost (i.e. rms or employees). If rms do not transfer the cost on to
their workers we should observe a disincentive to hire female workers on treated rms through a substitution
of females for males, observing a change in employment composition between treated versus untreated rms
(and hence a discontinuity of the share of female workers at the threshold). Hence rms will have all the
incentives to manipulate the threshold in order to avoid the regulation. If rms can transfer the full cost to
their workers then we should observe lower wages on those a¤ected (in non-competitive labour markets) or
in equilibrium (in competitive labour markets) and no manipulation of the threshold.
Our ndings suggest that on average nearly a 100% of the childcare cost is transferred to female workers
(fertile and non fertile) and male workers in the form of lower wages. We also observe that there is barely
not a signicant change in the employment composition (relative prices between males and females remain
unaltered once the threshold of 20 female workers is reached), which is consistent with the fact that rms
do not have incentives to manipulate the threshold because they transfer almost all the cost on to their
employees.
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Overall, despite that legally the nancial burden of article 203 is imposed on rms, the nal agents
who carry the burden are the workers of a¤ected rms. This result calls then to have in consideration the
potential unintended consequences of childcare regulations.
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Appendix
Leave one Out Cross Validation Bandwidth (Ludwig and Miller 2007)
The method for choosing the optimal bandwidth within the Regression Discontinuity framework is not
indisputable. Ludwig and Miller (2007) presents an alternative method for choosing the optimal bandwidth,
which consists in a leave-one-outcross validation (CV from hereon) procedure. Traditional CV procedures
may provide misleading results since they do not account for the discontinuity at the threshold and estimate
a function in the interior of the support. Ludwig and Millers (2007) alternative considers two estimations
at each side of the threshold, which centers on boundary predictions.
The procedure is the following:
(1) Given a bandwidth h we run separate regressions, leaving one observation out of the sample, on both
sides of the threshold considering only observations that are within this bandwidth (i.e. the threshold minus
the value of the running variable is, in absolute value, less or equal to the bandwidth).
(2) Using the estimates from both regressions, predictions of the dependent variable are computed (at
each side of the threshold) for the observation that was left out of the sample.
(3) The di¤erence between the predicted and observed dependent variable is computed.
(4) Repeating this exercise for each observation yields a complete set of di¤erences between the predicted
and observed dependent variable. The optimal bandwidth is the one that minimizes the mean square of this
di¤erence.
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McCrarys (2008) Discontinuity Test
The use of regression discontinuity designs (RD) has become more popular in the last decade. Relatively
low complex estimation techniques and relaxed identifying assumptions have made this possible. As Lee
(2008) and McCrary (2008) point out, a core assumption of the RD is the inability to alter the treatment
assignment rule by individuals. An clear example of a violation of this assumption is the one presented in
McCrary (2008). Suppose a doctor wishes to randomly assign patients a certain drug. In order to do so, the
doctor assigns patients into two waiting rooms, A and B, where those in the rst one will receive the drug
and the others will receive a placebo. If the treatment assignment rule is known by individuals and they
may undo the doctors assignment, then we would expect for room A to be crowded. In this case, because
of discontinuities of the assignment variable, the treatment e¤ect estimated by RD will probably be far from
a precise estimation as Lee (2008) formally shows that if there were manipulation of this variable then there
could be identication problems of the treatment e¤ect.
McCrary (2008) proposes a formal test in order to analyze if there are discontinuities, at the cuto¤, in
the assignment variable. This test consists in two steps. First, construct a detailed gridded histogram of the
assignment variable. Second, using local linear regressions, smooth the histogram in both sides of the cuto¤
of the assignment variable and test if there is a di¤erence in the density of both sides (at the cuto¤). This
applies for the case of a continuous assignment variable.
In the case of a discrete assignment variable, like the one in this article (number of female workers),
McCrarys (2008) test can also be applied. As Lemieux and Milligan (2008) show, it is necessary to run local
linear regressions on both sides of the cuto¤ and test if the predicted outcome (fraction or log fraction of the
assignment variable in the bins) of both sides is the same.
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Calculations of Childcare Cost pass-through on to Workers
In this section we present the calculations of the childcare cost transfer to workers by the rm, based on
our regression discontinuity estimates. According to our database, in rms that belong to the Commerce,
Financial Services or Social Services industries and that count with 19 female workers, the average monthly
wage for fertile female workers is $378,047 CLP (Chilean pesos), $415,575 CLP for non fertile female workers
and $443,476 CLP for males.26 The average rm with 19 female workers has 17 female workers, 2 non fertile
female workers and 25 male workers. Considering a simple average of the parametric e¤ects of Article N203
on wages and that the next female worker that the rm will hire is a fertile one, we have that the total
monthly penalization on wages is $628,044 CLP. The following Table resumes these calculations:
Table: Cost Transfer Calculations
Type of Worker Average Wage Number in a Firm RD E¤ect Cost Transfer
(CLP) With 20 Females27 (CLP)
Fertile Female $378,047 18* -3.8% $258,584
Non Fertile Female $415,575 2 -3.1% $25,766
Male $443,476 25 -3.1% $343,694
Total $628,044
Note: Average number of workers from rms with 19 female workers are considered. *We assume that the 20th female
worker hired is a fertile one and hence the original number of fertile female workers is 17. The Regression Discontinuity (RD)
e¤ect considers a simple average of the estimated parametric e¤ects.
According to the CASEN 2009 Survey, 13.9% of the working fertile females have a child aged between
6 and 24 months and hence are eligible for childcare provided by the employer.28 Thus, nearly 2.5 fertile
female workers of the rm will require the childcare service.29 The monthly cost of childcare is variable.
Public childcare (JUNJI) cost nearly $191,000 CLP and private ones range from $120,000 to $300,000, with
an average that is near the public cost. Hence, the expected childcare cost for the employer is $477,500
(CLP).30
However, as stated in Articles 203 and 206, other type of expenditures must be paid by the employer.
In particular, travel costs to the childcare facility, time travelled from the rm to the childcare facility and
26Currently (early may 2012), 1 US$ is nearly $500 CLP.
27We consider the average numbers of a rm with 19 female workers and that the next female hired is a fertile one.
28Dependent working fertile females from the private sector are considered.
29This results is obtained from: 13.9% (probability of having a child aged between 6 and 24 months)  18 (fertile female
workers).
30This results is obtained from: 2.5 (number of female workers that will requiere childcare)  $191,000 CLP (average childcare
cost).
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viceversa and time granted to the female worker for feeding her child, are indirect costs. At the moment
this database was created (October 2010), the cost of public transport was $500 CLP.31 Hence, the monthly
cost of transportation that the employer has to pay for each mother is $22,000 CLP.32 The cost associated
to productivity losses for the rm due to the time spent by the mother feeding her child (1 hour) can be
calculated as a fraction of monthly wages. This cost is approximately $47,256 CLP, one-eighth of the daily
wage.33 In the case of the time travelled, we assume that it takes to the mother 1 hour a day for getting
from the rm to the childcare facility and viceversa. Thus, the cost is nearly $47,256 CLP. The incremental
indirect cost that Article 203 generates is caused by the additional fertile female that we assume that the rm
hires. Hence, the indirect costs totalize an amount of (considering the incremental fertile female) $594,012
CLP.34
A summary of the total costs for the employer due to Articles 203 and 206 is presented in the following
Table:
Table: Total Costs due to Articles 203 and 206
Item Cost (CLP)
Childcare $477,500
Transport $22,000
Productivity Loss $94,512
Total $594,012
Note: The average number of female workers that will require childcare is considered.
We see that on average, the employer transfers to her workers approximately 100% of the total childcare
costs.
31This is the cost of Santiagos public transport system, Transantiago.
32Assuming that females must travel twice a day, we have that $22,000=$500 (public transport cost)  2 (trips in the day)
 22 (average worked days in the month).
338 working hours a day is the maximum allowed by the Chilean Labour Code.
34Our analysis is incomplete since we do not have information of the number of rms that have childcare facilities within
them and of the exact travel time.
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Tables
Table 1: Distribution of Workers and Firms by Number of Female Workers
Type of Firm Female Workers Male Workers Firms
(Number) (Number) (Number)
Less than 20 Female Workers 475,234 (28.1%) 1,430,388 (50.6%) 287,136 (96.8%)
20 or More Female Workers 1,217,994 (71.9%) 1,391,281 (49.4%) 9,358 (3.2%)
Total 1,693,228 2,821,669 296,494
Note: Percentages are presented in parentheses.
Table 2: Distribution of Fertile Female Workers by Type of Industry
Type of Industry Female Workers % of the Total
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishery 61,333 4.8%
Mines and Quarry 9,592 0.8%
Manufacture 95,801 7.5%
Electricity, Gas and Water 3,585 0.3%
Construction 34,884 2.7%
Commerce 288,208 22.6%
Transport, Storage and Communications 53,960 4.2%
Financial and Business Services 268,824 21.0%
Communal, Personal and Social Services 461,526 36.1%
Note: Not all female workers in the database present type of industry.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Fertile Female Workers Around the Threshold
Variable 15-19 Female Workers 20-24 Female Workers
Log Wage 12.62 12.63
(0.59) (0.60)
Age 33.24 33.34
(8.21) (8.20)
Commerce 0.36 0.32
(0.48) (0.47)
Financial and Business Services 0.21 0.21
(0.41) (0.41)
Communal, Personal and Social Services 0.42 0.46
(0.49) (0.50)
Number of Observations 29,779 20,577
Note: Mean of the variables is presented. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Non Fertile Female Workers Around the Threshold
Variable 15-19 Female Workers 20-24 Female Workers
Log Wage 12.57 12.60
(0.54) (0.59)
Age 54.77 54.69
(3.87) (3.83)
Commerce 0.33 0.24
(0.47) (0.42)
Financial and Business Services 0.19 0.17
(0.39) (0.37)
Communal, Personal and Social Services 0.48 0.60
(0.50) (0.49)
Number of Observations 4,363 3,230
Note: Mean of the variables is presented. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Male Workers Around the Threshold
Variable 15-19 Female Workers 20-24 Female Workers
Log Wage 12.81 12.81
(0.60) (0.61)
Age 37.55 37.37
(11.34) (11.38)
Commerce 0.42 0.43
(0.49) (0.50)
Financial and Business Services 0.35 0.30
(0.48) (0.46)
Communal, Personal and Social Services 0.22 0.27
(0.42) (0.44)
Number of Observations 44,463 32,620
Note: Mean of the variables is presented. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 6: Impact of Article 203 on Fertile FemalesLog Wages
Specication Estimate
Parametric
Linear  0:039
Quadratic  0:034
Cubic  0:038
Quartic  0:042
Nonparametric  0:040
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. For the nonparametric case the triangular
kernel is used and the optimal bandwidth, chosen following Ludwig and Miller (2007), is h = 14.
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Table 7: Impact of Article 203 on Non Fertile FemalesLog Wages
Specication Estimate
Parametric
Linear  0:027
Quadratic  0:023
Cubic  0:035
Quartic  0:039
Nonparametric  0:038
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. For the nonparametric case the triangular
kernel is used and the optimal bandwidth, chosen following Ludwig and Miller (2007), is h = 14.
Table 8: Impact of Article 203 on MalesLog Wages
Specication Estimate
Parametric
Linear  0:039
Quadratic  0:028
Cubic  0:029
Quartic  0:026
Nonparametric  0:040
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. For the nonparametric case the triangular
kernel is used and the optimal bandwidth, chosen following Ludwig and Miller (2007), is h = 14.
Table 9: Impact of Article 203 on Fertile FemalesLog Wages (Alternative Kernels)
Kernel E¤ect
Epanechnikov  0:039
Biweight  0:040
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. The optimal bandwidth for the
Epanechnikov and for the Biweight kernel is h = 14 (using the Ludwig and Miller (2007) approach).
Table 10: Impact of Article 203 on Non Fertile FemalesLog Wages (Alternative Kernels)
Kernel E¤ect
Epanechnikov  0:039
Biweight  0:036
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. The optimal bandwidth for the
Epanechnikov and for the Biweight kernel is h = 14 (using the Ludwig and Miller (2007) approach).
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Table 11: Impact of Article 203 on MalesLog Wages (Alternative Kernels)
Kernel E¤ect
Epanechnikov  0:031
Biweight  0:038
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. The optimal bandwidth for the
Epanechnikov and for the Biweight kernel is h = 14 (using the Ludwig and Miller (2007) approach).
Table 12: Impact of Article 203 on Di¤erent Outcomes (Alternative Bandwidths)
Outcome Di¤erence with Optimal Bandwidth
+2 +1 -1 -2
Fertile Females (Wages)  0:042  0:040  0:040  0:040
Non Fertile Females (Wages)  0:040  0:039  0:036  0:035
Males (Wages)  0:038  0:039  0:042  0:046
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. The optimal bandwidth was chosen
following Ludwig and Miller (2007) and we consider the triangular kernel in these estimations.
Table 13: Impact of Article 203 on Fertile Female WorkersWages (Smaller Bandwidths)
Bandwidth Estimate
6  0:033
7  0:041
8  0:043
9  0:043
10  0:043
11  0:042
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. We consider the triangular kernel in
these estimations.
Table 14: Impact of Article 203 on Non Fertile Female WorkersWages (Smaller Bandwidths)
Bandwidth Estimate
6  0:057
7  0:046
8  0:043
9  0:039
10  0:037
11  0:032
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. We consider the triangular kernel in
these estimations
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Table 15: Impact of Article 203 on Male WorkersWages (Smaller Bandwidths)
Bandwidth Estimate
6  0:075
7  0:089
8  0:085
9  0:072
10  0:065
11  0:054
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. We consider the triangular kernel in
these estimations.
Table 16: Impact of Article 203 on Di¤erent Outcomes (Di¤erent Slopes on Both Sides of the Discontinuity
Allowed)
Polynomial Fertile Females (Wages)
Linear  0:037
Quadratic  0:039
Cubic  0:041
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
Table 17: Falsication Test: E¤ects of Considering Di¤erent Thresholds on Fertile FemalesWages
Polynomial Threshold
17 23 30
Linear -0.002 -0.012 -0.019
Quadratic -0.012 0.010 0.015
Cubic -0.003 0.026 -0.005
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
Table 18: Falsication Test: E¤ects of Considering Di¤erent Thresholds on Non Fertile FemalesWages
Polynomial Threshold
17 23 30
Linear -0.003 0.002 -0.01
Quadratic -0.009 0.022 0.016
Cubic -0.009 0.031 0.018
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
Table 19: Falsication Test: E¤ects of Considering Di¤erent Thresholds on MalesWages
Polynomial Threshold
17 23 30
Linear 0.024 -0.039 -0.029
Quadratic 0.007 0.002 0.055
Cubic 0.026 0.012 0.064
Note: ,  and  represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
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Figures
Figure 1: Incentives generated by Childcare regulation in Chile
Figure 2: Log Wages (Mean) of Fertile Female Workers by Number of Female Workers
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Figure 3: Log Wages (Mean) of Non Fertile Female Workers by Number of Female Workers
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Figure 4: Log Wages (Mean) of Male Workers by Number of Female Workers
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Figure 5: Log Wages (Mean) of Male Workers by Number of Male Workers
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Figure 6: Log Wages (Mean) of Non Fertile Female Workers by Number of Non Fertile
Female Workers
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Figure 7: Covariates of Fertile Female Workers by Number of Female Workers
32
33
34
35
Fe
rti
le
 F
em
al
e 
W
or
ke
rs
' A
ve
ra
ge
 A
ge
10 15 20 25 30
Number of Female Workers
.2
.3
.4
.5
%
 C
om
m
er
ce
10 15 20 25 30
Number of Female Workers
.1
.2
.3
.4
%
 F
in
an
ci
al
 S
er
vi
ce
s
10 15 20 25 30
Number of Female Workers
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
%
 S
oc
ia
l S
er
vi
ce
s
10 15 20 25 30
Number of Female Workers
34
Figure 8: Covariates of Non Fertile Female Workers by Number of Female Workers
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Figure 9: Covariates of Male Workers by Number of Female Workers
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Figure 10: Density of the Firms by Number of Female Workers
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